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INTRODUCTION ' , ■: •  ^ - . \
The food and agricultural problems of sub-Saharan Africa ' 
are well documented (Eicher, 1982? UDSA, 1981? World 
■Bankj. 19 ) . If food security'is defined as the .ability
of food deficit countries, regions or households to meet ■ - '
targetlconsumption levels oh a regular annual basis, then 
it is apparent that issues of • food security will, 
iricreasingly, dominate the policy agenda in. sub-Saharan 
Africa for t h e 'remainder of the century.- Lele and Candler 
{1981) observe that the underlying assumptions for con­
ventional food security, analysis do not apply in sub- 
Saharan Africa. Typically there is both’ a traditional and 
~a. "large-scale food production sector. . The large-scale 
markets- exclusively to a publicly-owned monopsohistic 
parastatal while traditional producers retain food for 
home consumption as well as marketing in the barter., official 
and unofficial markets. The unofficial market may sell 
direct to consumers or export illegally at prices' ... \
considerably at variance with those officially, announced.
Thus most food transactions take place outside government 
control.in spite of the considerable investments in market­
ing services and infrastructure made by ..African governments - 
(Blackie^. forthcoming) . •
The development of efficient, low-cost marketing systems 
is fundamental .to successful agricultural development.
Reviews, of marketing systems in-sub-Saharan Africa consis­
tently criticise the role of governments in agricultural 
marketing although .the agenda for action shows considerable 
diversity of opinion (Blackie, forthcoming^ Heyer, 1976;
Lele and Candler, 1981 ; . World Bank, 19 ) . Numerous .
studies (see Child,. 1983) indicate that-private markets, 
in Africa are fairly efficient, Regional; prices and marketing 
margins, are closely related to costs. In-Kenya and ' . 
Tanzania, for example, illicit trade operates :within., the 
margins of the controlled, single-channel system (Heyer , .'
1976;'. von Freyhold, .1979) indicating that non-government . 
traders can operate more efficiently than parastatals 
despite, the additional .costsassociated- 'with• illegal 
activities,' Eicher and Baker (1981) found‘no evidence that ■' 
producers or; consumers .were exploited by middlemen and .. 
noted that where market entry appeared unrestricted', market 
chains were generally short.and there was little evidence 
of collusion exerting, signif icant downward pressures on -. 
producer prices. - ’
While the inefficiency of many public-sector "marketing 
agencies is. recognised, these agencies serVe important, 
political and infrastructural needs in sub-Saharan AFrica. 
Although their current operations typically leave much.to. 
be desired, their replacement in the foreseeable future o 
by efficiently run private sector agencies seems unlikely.
Even if.private sector marketing .is a feasible option, .the ; 
hist.orical predominance' of public marketing bodies 
requires the .careful/-'long-term, phasing opt of these, 
agencies and the progressiveldeVelopinent of private-
2sector channels, This is essential if .the weak.agricul­
tural economies of the region are not to be further/ 
'disrupted,, •
The, thesis of ,this paper is that considerable improvements 
in - efficiency can be made within the structure of parastatal 
marketing'typical.of;sub-Saharan Africa. The example’ ■
used is Zimbabwe which has an efficiently run.parastatal 
marketing service for most of the. main national 
agricultural commodities. Conventionally, this, system 
has almost exclusively served the. largecscale producers . 
.and urban consumers, but, since independence in 1980, it 
has been'drawn into providing services to traditional 
. farmers and ruralconsumers. Zim-' bwe is an agricultural 
country with agriculture .contributing approximately twenty. 
per cent of GDP arid* being the major employer of labour.
Total .annual agricultural output was approximately 
US$815 million in 1983,: of which maize production ,' "
contributed about .one third. The subject'of this- paper will 
be themaize marketing system of Zimbabwe and it will be 
shown how this system. could^.be modified with benefits to 
rural consumers, producers and the Zimbabwe government.
The proposals-draw particularly on Asian experience.
Blackie (1981 , 1,984) has drawn attention to the. relevance, 
particularly of the- Indian agricultural, experience, to the 
Zimbabwe situation.* Gsaenger and Schmidt . (.1977) sihow the 
Pakistan and Indian economies to be very similar; to that of 
Zimbabwe with distinct surplus and deficit areas,, dualistic 
production, low per capita' incomes and thirty to forty per 
:cent of the staple food being marketed. The-data suggest 
"there is little market exploitations price differentials 
between markets reflect transport costs, returns on storage 
are reasonable and voluntary procurement operations are 
..usually able to stabilize prices. Zoning, movement ■ .
restrictions and compulsory procurement have been shown to . 
destabilize .the food markets; prices between markets are .. 
higher in periods of strict control than when marketing is 
relatively free. ' ,
’ THE ZIMBABWE MAIZE MARKETING SYSTEM
A publicly controlled maize marketing system was 
initiated by the large-scale, commercial farmers when world 
prices-fell below production costs in the early 1930s. - 
The farmers.were,- and remain, predominantly white settlers 
; farming, freehold properties using modern production
* See also Ahmed ..and "Rustagi; (1984). for a. comparison of 
..agricultural marketing and price incentives between . 
selected African and Asian countries. " ■;
3' met heels: The-Grain Marketing Board ■ (GMB) is the sole legal 9
trader in maize in the commercial farming areas, which w
'occupy nearly half the'agricultural land in Zimbabwe, - - .fl
Most of the remaining land is farmed by traditional black 9  
.. producers under a variety 'of - production and land tenure 9
systems. - Within each communal -farming area. free , local m
trade; is permitted but..all external".sales must be made 9
through. the. GMB. \ '9
Maize is •delivered, either in ;bulk or in bags-,, to GMB. 9
.depots where a •national•inter-depot price - is paid according 9 
to grade . - Most depots are on the line .ofrail.-, and in.. 9
commercial , farming/'afeas c ' Since, independence, .however' a • 9
• number -of depots have, been established in communal, areas/. 9
.'These areas are also serviced by local co-operatives . and.. 9 
, approved buyers who hold a'., licence. t o  purchase maize, on .. 1
behalf of the GMB at. prescribed prices .• ' - ' 1
. Controlled marketing has been accompanied by government- :
intervention in producer and consumer maize pricing.
Government policy is one of self-sufficiency in maize 
supplies. Producer prices are set'on the basis-of- . j
recommendations from.the Ministry of .Agriculture which * 1_• i
uses production costs as'its main criterion. Maize meal ;
• prices for .consumers have .been set bv'the Ministry..of -.
Trade and Commerce since the mid. 1970s. ‘ Consumer prices
• have steadily fallen below producer prices, .'with the resultant 
national, subsidy rising from Z$26 million in 1973/80 to 
,Z$123- million in 1932/83 (Estimates ;of Expenditure.) * . :
. . Part* of the .subsidy is paid to the GMB to balance their 
. trading.account (selling price to millers being.held below •
■ cost) and. the balance is paid directly: to the four major- 
, .private milling companies to compensate for prescribed . - 
selling prices. which-are lower than costs , . ;T
■Ease of administration has confined tbe maize-.consumer- 
•subsidy to the four large urban mills. An estimated 200 
rural mills have been forced to close as traditional . ' ; 
i producers shift’ towards selling ’ grain and buying, hack--:
^subsidised meal (Stunning and; Muir, 1983),. Controlled 1
uniform retail pricing of maize meal has meant that maize .' 
meal can only be supplied at.a loss to many of the remoter,
-• but heavily populated, rural, areas (see Fig. -1),..' Crop 
'failures In these areas due to-.drought, have led to a - 
black market and-high -rural prices for maize'meal. .Thus- 
•it is the urban dwellerrather than the rural poor, who 
has reaped most benefit.from GMB activities,*
1 ’ * 90%. of the subsidy payments 'benefit the urban, consumers
|t , whilst only 2% is -received by . small-scale f armers (see.
1 -Child, 1983) . - ; . -- ■;:
THE AREAS AROUND MAJOR ROLLER-MEAL DISTRIBUTION 
POINTS WITHIN WHICH RETAIL MARGINS MAY EQUAL 
TRANSPORTATION COSTS
Letters represent miller centres
The cost of transport is based on a ten tonne 
lorry load (initial charge $40 plus 80c/km)
The controlled miller selling price is $129,40; 
the controlled retail price is $139,80; 
the marketing margin is $10,40 per tonne
The maximum distance based on a ten tonne lorry load 
at which the marketing margin will cover transport 
costs alone, is 75 km. .......
(Costs all based on 1981 data)
iThe task of determining administratively the appropriate 
price for maize-in Zimbabwe is complex, ' Zimbabwe's 
' geographical position' and trade routes'are. s.uch that 
maize supply buffering',.'either through trade or stock- - 
piling,, -is costly. The. very 'high- .bridging costs make both 
maize exports "and -imports'uneconomic/ requiring the 
country .to remain essentially self-sufficient -without 
large surpluses for export. Although, producer-prices - 
affect the. area, planted, the adoption of technology, and. 
the level of marketed production-(Muir, 1984), these 
responses are .confounded by highly variable weather. . 
conditions. Further, the patterns of both demand and 
supply are changing .as the development of the. country \ 
proceeds. Supply patterns are affected by'the changing 
composition-of the. country's farmers, following • . 
independence. Maize.is’the preferred staple fopd in:
, Zimbabwe and the demand,''which is growing in response, to 
rural-urban migration and population growth, can 
reasonably be expected to be relatively price inelastic, .
The current system was ofigirialiy designed to purchase 
maize from large-scale farmers in a few surplus areas for 
sale.to the major urban, centres, ' It did.not service the 
communal farming areas, implicitly, a.ssuming them to be 
self-sufficient in maize.'.
The problems associated with expanding GMB .operations in 
the .communal areas'are considerable. For example, in 
19.81-a high maize producer price, favourable weather and 
a relatively low consumer maize 'price resulted in large 
communal and commercial area marketed surpluses. The GMB- 
were faced with shortages of transport', storage facilities 
and finaned to purchase the crop, in the subsequent 
three years, poor producer .prices and crop failure.as a 
. result of drought in many of the communal areas,, have . 
altered the problem to one of distribution of supplies of 
maize, m e a l . . ' "
A common problem in Africa is that even where national 
stocks are managed we11 enough to provide the country with 
an adequate supply, local deficits occur, for example in 
.Kenya s . '
. -"The- failure has sometimes been because there is 
either too little or too much maize in the country. 
But.local shortages have also occurred, when there 
has been plenty of maize in the country as a whole,,, 
.Thus the Maize and Produce Board is -.not guaranteeing 
a supply of-maize in all areas at .the official 
price .,,.. This constitutes a very -basic failure 
, to fulfil its responsibilities'under the Ordinance,"
■g , / (Heyer, 1.976, p. 325)
Zimbabwe is no exception,. Since 1982. the GMB has had 
problems moving maize from surplus to deficit areas in 
time to meet demand, despite an overall surplus,' - imports 
- of maize to augment national supplies were only necessary 
in 1984,' . ' V  -
The task of achieving, maize self-sufficiency is difficult 
enough when dealing with/a limited-number- of large-scale 
producer's and marketing primarily to urban consumers.
The .greater task of servicing.the'majority of Zimbabwe’s 
producers and consumers logically, requires a careful . .. 
analysis of the strength's, and weaknesses of the current 
system.
On the positive side is the very-real contribution that 
the GMB has made to the Zimbabwe maize industry. The - 
Board arose from-producer dissatisfaction with.variable 
world market prices at a time when local markets -were, 
thin and.‘exports-.-essential 'to the development of the 
industry (Muir,-1 98.4} = Although , circumstances' have 
changed, the GMB has remained responsive to itsclientele 
of large*-sco?le farmers arid urban consumers.- More'recent 
events haye seen it': again modifying its activities to - serve 
a-wider range of producers and consumers,' ' -
On the negative side, the expansion, of the GMB network/". 
together -with the resultant .increase in regions, effectively 
receiving a national uniform price 'for.maize "wil-l signifi­
cantly increase the GMB’s cost of operation^. "
It is government policy to have a Primary Rural Marketing 
depot within 70 km of -.very producer .in order to 
encourage rural., marketing. At present, ’ twelve", of these 
low^-qost, small throughput depots are in operation although 
four cover their costs of. operatidru Losses’can be 
substantial with^ for example, the Buhera. depot losing 
Z$11,S6 per tonne - .(Cal'lear, -19S2- The uniform, maize 
pricing policy'can be e pected to compound the problem.
Spatially uniform prices are in effect a subsidy to remote 
farmers - but-only remote farmers with access to a JGMB ' 
depot. This encourages the production of bulky crops in 
remote areas', lower pro-., ction in deficit areas and higher • 
-transport costs as .all marketed'output must go via the. 
depot. ■ "’' / v' '. . - ’ . - - . • . ' . - .
Farmer . .- . ., d • . i 'deficit, area '
depot
Uniform prices are usually defended on equity grounds but 
they seldom achieve equity:in reality, particularly as the' 
poorer farms are “often found in'deficit- areas where uniform 
prices hold down pro .cer prices (see-Muir,. 198.4- and*
Jansen 1979).
Seasonally uniform-prices impose the entire storage function 
for the. nation on'the GMB because there is no incentive 
for farmersprocessors' or..consumers to. store1 the grain.
The-heavi,ly suhsid, sed consumer prices of maize meal, 
together with uniform pricing policies and peasarit 
.expectations resulted, in the near- failure of the • ysiem to 
provide .marketing services to -producers and consumers-, -.
Figure 2. 7
THE COSTS OF A CENTRALISED MARKETING SYSTEM
Centralised System Local Trade
$/mt $/mt
1. Transport to depot (??) 2,00 1. producer price 120,
2 . Producer price 120,00 2. rural miller 25,
3 . GMB margin — 37,00
4 . Urban miller margin + 48,00 $145,00
5. Retail margin (6%) 8,00
6. Transport - 50 km. 5,00
220,00
Controlled price 140,00
Loss per tonne $  80,00
Information based on 1981 data 
Source: Child (1983) ,
8Figure 1 showed ,that many of the rural areas-will not be • 
supplied with maize^ meal at the official price', -These- 
areas rare those which' can least afford a failure of - staple 
f ood supplies . They.are - the areas in which ;per capita 
food output is declining and' the .man-land ratio increasing 
•so .that less severe, weather- conditions ..will result in food 
deficits, . .
The current, system .does not - cater' for the needs of the.. • 
rural poor, it is costly in terms of subsidies and it 
misallocates and "Wastea1'. resources, it concentrates the 
-processing ..industries and subsidies in. the. urban areas and 
places an unnecessarily high.strain on transport and 
storage facilities,. • -
Figure indicates :nai tne. existin' is - very- nuor
more expensive than a system which would encourage local- 
processing,, storage and distribution.:. The system in -1381. 
encouraged a flow of food .out of rural. areas, decreasing - 
self-sufficiency .and resulting in food shortages in some 
.areas even when there were adequate national supplies.
The los_ses are no longer, as* large partly as a result of 
increased consumer, prices and, partly because peasant farmers 
are no' longer under the''illusion- that the official marketing 
system will fulfil its needs , at official prices. But the . 
system as currently .organised, still results in an inefficient, 
and,inequitable allocation of resources,' .
THE’ PROPOSED SYSTEM,. \ i '•
Underlying the following* propositions are- two key' assumption'ss
1 , Controlled marketing -answers a'real political and 
'economic, need, ini Zimbabwe, The uncertainty of food 
production and the difficulties of trade in food /in 
southern Africa are such -that governments-are v . ' .
unlikely to gamble-on private : .-trading' to-supply 1 the 
market, Governemnts of such different, political > • . :
- persuasions and economic-strength as Tanzania and the .
•• Republic of South-Africa rely, extnesively on public 
'sector involvement in. food marketing, Gsaenger and.
■ Schmidt (1377) have, shown that, with low income and .
. price e 1-as'ticities of demand for maize,, consumer 
welfare, particularly of low income groups, will 
.fluctuate widely under free market conditions^ an 
undesirable and politically destabilising situation,
- Their^artaiysis “of the welfare effects of various 
.-stablissation .schemes indicates that price .
stabilisation has. net positive welfare implications ..
. where fluctuations are due to random shifts in.supply•<* 
Such: a situation ^xists in Zimbabwe where total maize 
production is highly influenced by annual variation 
. in. rainfall, p . ' .
\2.Existing public food marketing agencies are not .. 
inherently inefficient. They have, however, been . .
' designed primarily to serve large-scale farmers , ■
and urban consumers.,. It' is the simple expansion, 
of such agencies to serve small-scale farmers .and . ■
• - rural consumers in recent years that underlies their 
very poor performance in .many countries (Blackie ,
. forthcoming). :The. efficiency of"such agencies can- •
-be significantly improved- if. their, design is altered •
in accordance with their expanded functions/ •
The objective of the system proposed in this paper is the ,
efficient and equitable allocation of resources, for maize 
production.while ensuring public control of maize stocks.
Instead of a single uniform national price for maize, the ■ -
GMB would, set,-, annually, both a-floor and a ceiling price 
for maize. Direct trading in maize between, producers and,. . 
wholesalers- would take place within these limits» The GMB, . 
with it's existing infrastructure of silos and depots is • • ■
obviously well-placed to compete ’as a wholesaler with--private 
traders in order to build up its stocks,- - The role'of the GMB 
would be to ensure sufficient national stocks to be able to 
intervene effectively in- the market while enabling private trader 
traders to operate- in those market sectors unsuited to a . 
centralised public agency. The floor and ceiling prices . , 
would buffer ijoth consumer and producer against major price, 
fluctuations.* . - . . -
The recommended-ceiling price shoud equate'roughly with the' 
landed cost of.imported maize. A lower price would encourage 
imports while a'higher price would induce'local production' 
when imports are cheaper.0 The recommended floor, price ' . 
should equate with the f.o.r. export returns. .-These would 
be based on total average returns not just on the returns :
. qf exports to one particular market. . . ' '
i2
* To 'illustrate the supply variability.,. marketed maize.
- production in the 1980/81 season was two.million' tonnes
as opposed to six hundred thousand tonnes-.'in thei 19-82/83 ' ' 
drought, season. • . - . . , ' -
Imported grain maize, would have cost .ab&ut 2$ 200-210 .. '
per tonne: compared to the GMB selling.price for-local . 
grain of Z$157 per tonne. . . , - •
# . Returns oh exports to other countries, in the region-'are
considerably higher than exports, through the World Food 
Programme or to countries,in Europe and Asia,-.
Muir (1984) has drawn attention to, the cyclical pattern of 
administered, maize: prices in; Southern and Eastern 'Africa. Her,, 
•analysis shows'the relationship''between ,this-,pattern and the ., 
ocrcurcince'of droughts , and the -detrimental effect that this 
• has on- national and regional, food security. While.theoretically 
both floor and.ceilingprices may be .set according to export' 
and import parities respectively, there' are major .practical. : 
difficulties in implementations'. . ; ‘ . g
1 There are•important advantages 
maize supply - in•announcing pre 
any- trade, in maize only takes 
setting • . "■.
when 'stabilising • 
■planting prices but 
■lace if ter-price, ■
2 It is unlikely .that there would - be both imports .and 
exports in any one year, except where fulfilling 
previous'contracts,
Muir’s work.. indicates the feasibility of using the US' f-.o.b.. 
Gulf Port .price as the, basis .for' .setting both floor and ceiling 
prices ... -.If ./this'. system. was-used,.-there, .would; be a fairly wide 
spread between f.loor and ceiling prices .(.estimated at 2# 1.1.5 to 
. Z^21G . in 19.8.3) .. A wide margin would minimise transactions-. 
and expense to. the GMB. The immediate reduction i,n the national 
subsidy Jail! could be used for investment in .production' and _ 
inf rastructurai improvement'.-.. By .limiting GMB grain purchases- 
and sales., better and more .efficient use of. Zimbabwe1 s scarce. 
..transport:resources would be made. The free internal market 
would ensure more direct routes, than the centralised GMB. , ..Maize 
need ohly .be moved according to local and regional demands ... 
instead, ;of into, and out of central silos..
Maize would be-encouraged in those regions, with a comparative 
advantage and would receive, encouragement in .deficit area's. 
Seasonally variable jprices would allow for. better use. of, 
cheaper on-farm and ;other storage-facilities-. .The high”,costs " 
associated with centralized storage, would -be considerably 
reduced while unnecessary and costly sales and-'repurchase'would 
be ;discour.aged. ", : - ■ ’ . . .
-Urban; consumers'' welfare . would be reduced under this 'system .. 
since maize meal prices: would be variable and inevitably-higher 
than the currently- subsidised prices - in the short run'... Thisis 
offset-by the reductiori in inefficent, and inequitable food I . 
subsidies and. by the gain in.producer welfare. . In the longer^ 
term consumers would also benefit from a .low-margin marketing 
service, and increased agricultural productivity.
Producer incomes would' be- stabilized, .with higher prices', in 
poorer, years-, compensating, for, lower yields. Agricultural ...
; investment , would tend to increase, raising, the ..productive , '•• 
■potential of this sector. -Evidence from other African countries 
suggest that producer prices would be'higher- under a less . 
restrictive system (Jansen 1980), - Higher producer prices-,-', 
increased investment in rural areas from reduced subsidies 
arid increased supplies in deficit'areas would mean-that the 
rura-l:-‘ poor would be among the. main 'immediate -beneficiearies of.
11
of such a’ programme.* This would represent a major reversal 
of the distor.tionary urban bias so evident- in agricultural 
policy in Sub-saharan AFrica.'
The management of national maize food security would .remain 
■firmly within .the GMB's control under -the





1» The maintenance of a strategic reserve
Importation of maize to - cover - supply shortfalls,.
The GMB is well-suited to ■ undertake both these: functions' and 
to determine' the appropriate balance between' theirv. ; The main* 
tenance of a strategic reserve is not attractive .to the 
private sector,, . According to Gsaenger and Schmidt (1977} 
"the.private sector will be neither able nor willing to 
perform such a-, function- effectively" ; Empirical evidence 
from Tanzania -{Kr-iesel et al. 1970) shows .that while free , 
market conditions were able to equate internal . supply and 
demand in normal seasons- (1956 to 1960) this was not true
in severe droughts (1961)' when deficits occurred, Similarly- 
the import and export of grain sensibly should remain’under 
public management „. The GMB iswell informed on both national
supply conditions and cn government foreign currency allocation 
priorities. Trade in bulk commodities tp a .land-locked'country 
such as Zimbabwe is difficult, slow and expensive'/ On the
other hand, the aintenance of buffer stocks sufficient to- - 
stabilise supplies- in all ye'ars is a. costly exercise (Bigman 
and Reutlinger, 1979) . . Thus maize food security is not an 
"either/or".question but rather one of trade-offs between. 
the size and cost of the hubliely-owned, strategic stockpile 
and the volume -and cost of periodic importsv The analysis and 
implementation, of sucha trade-off is the legitimate role of .- 
a public agency such as the GMB. - .' . -
Current, annual storage costs for maize' in Z imbabwe 'are Z./32 
per tonne {Child, 1983). Severe droughts are a frequent but ; 
irregular feature o.f^ th'e African environment with, in Zimbabwe, 
a severe' drought occuring, on average once in seven-years - 
(Edwards et al, 1983) . A strategic reserve -to meet all 
eventualities is thus impractical. • on both cost and physical 
grounds (Jansen, 1982) . A strategic reserve based'on grain • . ; . 
purchased in a good crop year compares favourably with the 
cost of' importing grain. Assume a floor price o f . .
Z$115 per tonne and an average GMB purchase price for the 
strategic reserve' somewhat higher than that (say Z$140 per 
tonne which was the 1983 maize pre-planting price). ..Assume 
further that the maize is. stored for two years in the stockpile 
buffer., stocks would compare favourably with the price, of imports. 
The.use of a shadow, exchange rate would emphasise the -desireabilit 
of a' strategic stockpile . -f- - . . .  -' ;
*Large.™scale maize’producers, would also’benefit'where , the 
proposed .system results in increased producer prices but peasant 
farmers are becoming increasingly important., with an estimated 
'25% of the GMB supplies coming'-from the communal sector 
in 1983/84, ’ ... - .
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CONCLUSIONS
Zimbabwe has a well-run,. prolucer' initiated .single-channel 
maize marketing system'which has fulfilled its objectives., 
of maintaining;national maize self-sufficiency and 
supplying maize to urban centres'. This -system' is . currently 
under considerable -strain as its activities are - 1
to. cater for small-scale, producers arid 'rural consumers. The 
improvement^in the welfare of fche^e last.two groups is - 
fundamental to increased'national prosperity. Rises in' the 
agricultural productivity of small-scale farmers and .in the 
',marketlng- services .offered- to thenv are essential' components 
of • national- development. '.-The- .qurrent -policy, .-however, cf 
•simply -expanding the GjMB '-s .function's, without altering - its . 
structure has proved costly f inancially and'-economicallyv ' ' 
This problem is exaccerbated. by uniform, national consumer . 
and producer prices.
This paper .proposes that-single-channel marketing be replaced-by 
an internal free market .operating between floor and .ceiling- 
prices?. these prices being maintained by GMB supply manipu­
lation to prevent excessive producer and consumer welfare, 
fluctuations. . Such ..evidence, as is available suggests that 
.such a system would be more efficient, and have beneficial 
effects on Zimbabwean development. The system is more "equitable 
for the rural poor. It could be'expected to produce, greater 
stability of producer incomes, more reliable food supplies, ! 
higher producer prices and the release of public-funds currently 
used for consumer - subsidies for infrastructural develbp'meht
.The GMB would retain its role as a major trader in maize but 
with particular emphasis ori ensuring.adequate national maize 
supplies. The private sector would take on an: expanded,role 
.in local and regional grain trade.- Thus public control over 
.maize, stocks is, maintained while avoiding the hgh costs, ., 
inefficiencies and general- exploitation of both producer, and • 
■consumer associated with African parastatnl food marketing, 
"systems. g ■ e . " .
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